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Abstract. In this paper I highlight two opposing models of the notion of divine revelation: 
the propositional and the radical. The propositional understanding of revelation was 
central to theology and philosophy until the 19th century. Since then, a number of other 
models of revelation have emerged. I define as radical the understanding of revelation 
which emphasizes two features of revelation: 1) God’s existence is *per se* revelatory; 2) 
God’s revelation is *per se* self-revelation. I propose too an assessment of the notion of 
propositional revelation as presented by Richard Swinburne. And I offer detailed analyses 
of two representatives of the early understanding of divine revelation as self-revelation: 
the views of Bernard Bolzano and Anton Günther. Bolzano, the renowned mathematician, 
was also a philosopher of religion; and Günther, one of the most ingenious writers in 
Austrian philosophy, was not only a theologian but also a philosopher comparable to the 
important figures of 19th century German thought.1
Introduction
The expression “divine revelation” is traditionally considered as belong-
ing to the vocabulary of Christian theology. According to theologians, 
divine revelation is the most fundamental theological notion without 
which no other theological concept can be properly understood and 
explicated.2 Theological consideration of the concept of revelation, that 
is to say a theology of revelation, is therefore a fundamental discipline, 
1 I express my gratitude to Tom Flint, Fred T. Crosson, and to other members of 
the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame for their helpful 
comments on the first version of the present text. I thank Richard Swinburne too for his 
important and useful remarks.
2 Josef Schmitz, Offenbarung (Düsseldorf: Pathmos, 1988), 10.
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which systematically determines the building of theology.3 On the other 
hand, a theology of revelation cannot merely consist of arguments based 
on supernatural revelation. Fundamental theology is first of all a philo-
sophical discipline, for its methods and contents are based on what is 
traditionally termed unassisted, as opposed to supernaturally enlightened, 
human reason. A fully developed theology of revelation thus starts with 
the philosophy of divine revelation.
Just as the structure of a theology of revelation is dual, containing 
both introductory and higher level theological considerations, so too 
the philosophy of revelation has a twofold structure. While it can be 
conceived of as an introduction to theology properly so called, it is at the 
same time a philosophical discipline in its own right.4 We can even say 
that a philosophy of revelation is the preeminent philosophical discipline 
inasmuch as it deals with the ultimate sources of human knowledge. 
According to the traditional understanding of theological propaedeutics, 
a merely philosophical approach to the problem of divine revelation 
consists in demonstrating the possibility, necessity, and discernability 
of revelation. As revelation entails the revealing subject, God, thus the 
philosophy of revelation — or at least some part of it — argues in due 
course for the existence and attributes of such a God.5 There is also the 
important question, if there is a God Who reveals important information 
to certain persons, what kind of recipient is needed in order to be able to 
receive divine revelation? The question of the conditions of possibility for 
the human reception of divine revelation is for many authors the decisive 
philosophical question in a philosophy of revelation.6
I define the expression “divine revelation” as an act of God by which 
some uniquely significant information becomes accessible for a certain 
number of human and non-human persons concerning their origin, 
present situation, and future; as well as concerning the reality they live 
3 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, De revelatione per Ecclesiam Catholicam proposita 
(Torino: Marietti, 1944), I, x-xi; Rene Latourelle, Theology of Revelation (New York: Alba 
House, 1966).
4 In the Introduction to Models of Revelation, Dulles defines his approach to the 
problem of revelation as belonging to the realm of fundamental theology, that is to say 
philosophy.
5 Peter Eicher, Offenbarung. Prinzip neuzeitlicher Theologie (München: Kosel, 1977), 507.
6 Karl Rahner, Foundations of the Christian Faith (New York: Crossroad, 1989).
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in and know to a certain extent.7 The God of classical theism is such 
that any of His acts counts as a certain kind of revelation, inasmuch as 
an act of God is an act of an infinite and absolute being Who, by acting, 
reveals His infinity and absoluteness. As we shall see, the concept of divine 
revelation proves to be a complicated one, and the above definition serves 
as a preliminary orientation only.
A history of the concept of revelation should emphasize that it 
was in response to the naturalistic and rationalistic tendencies of the 
Enlightenment period that systematic theories of revelation of quite 
different kinds — from J. G. Fichte to the teaching of the First Vatican 
Council, or from F. D. Schleiermacher to Karl Barth — gradually emerged. 
Before the First Vatican Council no council or official declaration of the 
Church dealt with the concept of divine revelation in an articulate way 
and it was only the Second Vatican Council that issued a thoroughly 
developed text, that of Dei Verbum, explaining the Catholic standpoint in 
view of various debates on divine revelation. In both texts, however, the 
capability of natural, unassisted human reason to recognize the existence 
of God without divine revelation is clearly propounded.
One central point in the philosophical and theological discussions 
concerned the nature of divine revelation. For a long time, the Classical 
understanding of revelation took the term as signifying most impor-
tantly God’s special actions by which He communicates some definite 
truths or propositions in order to inform certain human persons about 
verities indispensable for their salvation. Such revealed propositions 
were considered instructions — based on the authority of the Church’s 
magisterium — to be listened to, freely acknowledged and followed by all 
persons wishing to participate in the divine work of salvation. However, 
the propositional understanding of revelation (hereafter PR) came to be 
challenged by a different approach to divine revelation, emphasized by 
theologians and philosophers seeking new ways to understand divine 
revelation. They gradually realized the insufficiencies of the notion of 
propositional revelation especially under the influence of new forms of 
7 By ‘God’ I understand the conception of classical theism. Accordingly, there ‘is’ an 
ultimate, absolute and infinite, and in some sense personal being who has created reality 
in its totality by the act of his free will, who maintains this reality and takes care of it in 
a complex fashion, a being referred to as ‘God’ in the English language.
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thought originating in the Kantian critique of traditional theology in the 
Critique of Pure Reason.8
Let me term the other understanding of divine revelation radical 
revelation (hereafter RR). I call this kind of revelation radical for two 
reasons. First, it sees God’s reality as revelatory per se; God’s reality, on 
this view, is self-revelatory. Second, divine revelation is not considered as 
an activity of God resulting in a set of propositional truths, but rather as 
disclosing (manifesting or revealing) what God is in Himself, in a way 
that cannot be termed propositional in its genuine form. RR can properly 
be called God’s self-revelation. There are various ways to construe what 
God’s self-revelation consists in, but the way pointed out, for instance, 
in Dei Verbum — namely that God’s self-revelation is His historical ac-
tion — seems to be the most widely accepted view. This is not to say that 
divine revelation, as God’s self-revelation, cannot be conceived of in a 
different way; as an example of another approach I shall investigate Anton 
Günther’s view below.
Although it was F. W. J. Schelling, and following him G. W. F. Hegel, who 
invented and introduced the expression ‘self-revelation’ (Selbstoffenbarung) 
as a technical term into the philosophical and theological discussions of 
the 19th century, the notion had been present in various works before that 
time.9 The German word for revelation, Offenbarung, was especially apt to 
give the term a broad meaning. Offenbarung means, literarily, ‘disclosing’ 
or ‘manifesting’. Thus German theologians, by using this word instead of 
a version of the Latin revelatio (as most European languages do), had a 
language-based inclination to understand revelation as the most general 
8 See Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
1952), I, II, II, III, VII. Even if the distinction between propositional and non-propositional 
revelation can be typically identified as traditionally characteristic of the mainstream 
Catholic and Protestant viewpoints respectively, Keith Ward is right in pointing out that 
the conception of propositional revelation “is nowhere better set forth than in Calvin’s 
Institutes.” Ward offers a detailed and instructive analysis of this difference in Keith Ward, 
Revelation and Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 212–232.
9 The English self-revelation was the translation of Selbstoffenbarung and did not 
appear before the 1820s. In German, solid compound forms of selbst and Offenbarung start 
to surface by the end of the 1500s. Selbstoffenbarung in the definite meaning of revealing 
oneself as oneself was first used, not yet as a technical term, by the 16–17th century German 
mystic, Jacob Böhme.
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act of God manifesting or disclosing Himself.10 Yet the ancient doctrine 
of the Trinity already shows that various revealed propositions have been 
latently considered as entailing divine self-revelation. Christianity, by 
emphasizing the propositional character throughout the centuries, never 
denied that PR was based in the last analysis on God’s self-revelation.11 
The theological synergy between Christian denominations throughout 
the 20th century in matters of revelation is well demonstrated by the 
effects of the radical theory of revelation of Karl Barth on the one hand, 
and the intricate understanding of revelation offered by Karl Rahner on 
the other hand.
Divine revelation understood as PR highlights two aspects of revela-
tion: first, the aspect of propositional truths explicit in the Scripture, in 
the tradition, and in the teachings of the Church. Second, it accentuates 
the recipient of PR in terms of the intellectual and volitional functions 
required for the acceptance of a revelation propositional in character. 
While divine revelation as PR narrows down the possible scale of God’s 
revealing activity, it also reduces the possibilities of human persons in 
communicating with God. Thus, PR does not consider divine revelation 
as an encounter between God and man, nor does it allow features of im-
mediacy in the divine-human relationship. Rather, PR entails a notion of 
the recipient of revelation as a being possessing especially understanding 
and will, in order to conceive the propositions and to approve them. On 
the other hand, the emphasis on propositions goes together with the 
emphasis on the characteristic warrant of such propositions, that is the 
authority of the Church.
10 The German Offenbarung was originally the translation of the Greek apokalupsis. Yet 
the Greek word, itself again a translation of the Hebrew gala, meant simply the removal 
of a cover. In German, however, the compound is put together from offen (open), and 
barung (making bare, naked, free). Unintentionally, the German translation introduced a 
much wider meaning into the traditional meaning of apocalupsis-revelatio.
11 The explicitly propositional understanding of divine revelation was proposed during 
the post-Tridentine period, by among others Francisco Suarez. His understanding of 
revelation shifted the emphasis from the action of God (understood as power) to the 
action of God (understood as object, see Latourelle, pp. 181 sq.). God’s revelation is 
“the simple and sufficient proposition of the revealed objects” (Latourelle, p. 183.). Avery 
Dulles considers propositional revelation as one model out of various other models 
(Dulles 1992). 
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As opposed to PR, divine revelation understood as RR spells 
out the radical character of divine revelation. By “radical character,” 
I understand, first, the fact that divine revelation does not merely 
consist of propositions but rather sets of propositions, that is systems 
of propositional truths. The unity of such systems however cannot be 
expressed propositionally; so divine revelation is in the last analysis 
non-propositional. Second, RR emphasizes that divine revelation is 
identical with divine action in the various meanings of the term, 
but primarily with reference to God’s activity aimed at fulfilling His 
intention to realize the economy of salvation. RR is not confined to 
the created world; just as the work of salvation is realized by God’s 
revealing His own reality, so too RR refers to God’s original activity 
taken in all the four senses of the term mentioned above. Such a view 
of RR does not imply that God’s absolute and infinite reality can 
become revealed in its absoluteness and infinity to created beings. It 
implies, however, that God communicates Himself not only immanently, 
that is in His absolute and infinite reality, but also with respect to 
the created world. Inasmuch as RR implies PR in a certain way, RR 
does not lack propositional truths, whereas its whole significance is 
given in view of God’s full activity.
In what follows I examine two models of divine revelation. 
In section 2, I consider the model of PR by considering Richard 
Swinburne’s view. In section 3, I develop two versions of the model 
of RR based on the work of the Austrian philosopher Bernard 
Bolzano (1781–1848). Another Austrian philosopher, Anton Günther 
(1783–1863) develops a different version of RR, which I investigate 
in section 4. As we shall see, Bolzano offers a weak and Günther 
a strong version of RR.
Propositional Revelation
In order to explain the characteristics of PR, I make use of Richard 
Swinburne’s view as propounded in Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy. 
I have chosen Swinburne’s book because he clearly points out that his 
work is about propositional revelation, while he does not deny the existence 
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of another kind of revelation.12 Swinburne spells out in detail that some 
propositions central to divine revelation may be understood in meta-
phorical or analogical senses, that is in ways not immediately given in 
the normal use of sentences containing such propositions. His view of 
PR is complex and allows a perspicacious interpretation of PR. I shall, 
however, point out that even his elaborate understanding of PR can be 
criticized for not taking into account what I term RR. The main point 
of my criticism consists in this, that PR cannot be properly investigated 
without appropriately contemplating the dimension of RR.
Swinburne briefly investigates the distinction between PR and an-
other kind of revelation, God’s action in human history. According to 
Swinburne,
Divine revelation may be either of God, or by God of propositional truth. 
Christianity has claimed that Christian revelation has involved both of these; 
God revealed himself in becoming incarnate (i.e. human) as Jesus Christ, and 
by the teaching of Jesus and the Church which he founded God revealed 
various propositional truths. My primary concern in this book is with revela-
tion in the secondary sense of revelation of propositional truth.”13
As becomes clear from the above quotation, Swinburne distinguishes 
between two basic kinds of revelation: 1. The revelation “of God,” that 
is to say of God revealing Himself in the incarnation of Christ. 2. The 
revelation “by God of propositional truth,” which I termed PR above. 
Swinburne’s emphasis is on the second kind, without however denying 
the existence of further kinds, such as knowledge of God made available 
to us in private ways, or God’s actions in history. He suggests, however, 
that in his approach the propositional form of revelation remains the main 
target of investigation. He argues that God’s self-revelation or historical 
actions cannot be properly analyzed in non-propositional terms.
12 The problem of propositional revelation has been considered and analyzed in 
Terence Penelhum’s essay (in: Avis, op. cit. See also Dulles, op. cit.). 
13 Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy, Second Edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 1–2. In the first edition of his book, Swinburne does not 
speak of God’s self-revelation; he only points out that though there are various forms of 
revelation his concern is with revelation of propositional truth. See Swinburne, Revelation, 
1992, 2–3.
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The problem of PR can be seen more clearly if we try to clarify what 
Swinburne understands by a proposition. He carefully distinguishes be-
tween token and type sentences, and defines the proposition as expressed 
in token sentences:
The proposition which a token sentence s expresses is that element of claim 
in what is said which is also made by any other token sentence (whether of 
the same type or not) which is synonymous with s.14
A proposition, then, is the meaning of a token sentence, which can be 
expressed by other token sentences as well. In order to be able to grasp 
such a meaning, it needs to be in a propositional form, according to 
Swinburne; that is in a form, which makes it possible to understand the 
proposition. Thus for instance I can have the same proposition in two 
token sentences, one in German, the other in English, and if I have a 
sufficient knowledge of the two languages, I am able to grasp the same 
proposition in both sentences. A proposition describing some features 
of God can be grasped in various token sentences, for instance in various 
languages. In all cases, I grasp the same proposition.
“Grasping the same proposition,” however, is not without difficulties 
in the Christian context. Depending on the meaning of ‘grasping’ and of 
similar terms, we can distinguish between a traditional and a rationalistic 
understanding of certain propositions of Christianity. According to the 
rationalistic understanding, human beings are able to grasp or understand 
fully every proposition about God. The traditional understanding, on the 
other hand, very often refers to the notion of ‘mysterium’. Accordingly, 
there are second order mysteries (mysteria non stricte dicta) which can be 
grasped or understood fully once they are revealed. Such mysteries can 
be expressed in propositions that are clear and can be sufficiently grasped 
by human reason. Such a mystery is, for instance, the doctrine of God’s 
incarnation, which can be argued for once divine incarnation is already 
an accomplished fact. Thus it can be argued that God, if He is infinitely 
good and human beings cannot be helped otherwise, may take a human 
form in order to manifest His love for human beings and to ensure their 
salvation.
14 Swinburne, Revelation, 2007, 8.
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On the other hand, there are first order mysteries (mysteria stricte dicta) 
which, even if revealed, cannot be fully grasped or understood. The propo-
sition “God is three persons in one substance” is such that its meaning, that 
is its propositional character, cannot be properly understood by a finite 
mind. If we define a proposition as what can be grasped or understood fully, 
then first order mysteries, even if expressed in propositional form, cannot 
be called propositional strictly speaking. Even if we introduce metaphor 
and analogy into our understanding of such mysteries, we still face the 
difficulty that there is a categorical difference between a metaphorical and 
analogical understanding of certain propositions (such as propositions in 
literary works) on the one hand, and propositions referring to first order 
mysteries on the other hand. Propositions referring to first order mysteries 
cannot be propositionally understood, since the infinite and absolute 
God — in accordance with the view of classical theism — cannot be fully 
conceived of, grasped, or understood.
The expression ‘mystery’ refers first to mysteria stricte dicta. A mystery 
is precisely such that its meaning cannot be grasped or understood fully. 
Mysteries considered understandable once revealed are mysteries only in 
virtue of first order mysteries. God is above all non-understandable, given 
His absoluteness and infinity; He is the very first “first order mystery.” 
Only because of first order mystery am I able to understand second order 
mysteries that are derivative of the previous kind. In order to be able to 
conceive of propositions expressing second order mysteries, I need to 
have the conception of first order mysteries, that is a conception of divine 
revelation as possessing the character of such mysteries. Divine revelation 
is a revelation, of the first order, of first order mysteries. Even if they can 
be expressed in propositional form, they are not, most importantly of a 
propositional character.
Let me briefly point out the problem of PR from a different angle. 
According to Bernard Bolzano (whose concept of revelation will be con-
sidered below), one of the most important terms in logic is “proposition 
as such” (Satz an sich). “Propositions as such” exist ideally in themselves, 
but can be exemplified in acts of judgment by judging them true or 
false. Thus in Bolzano’s vocabulary ‘judgments’ (Urteile) more or less 
amount to what we have termed ‘propositions’ above. A judgment in 
Bolzano’s definition is a proposition taken to be true or false in an act of 
judgment, that is to say in a cognitive act. We may say that a judgment 
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is a proposition exemplified in the act of any created being. Judgments 
exemplify propositions as such in various ways, but it is not the case that 
every proposition as such can be exemplified in judgments. There are 
propositions as such which we did not, do not, and shall not know; and 
others we cannot exemplify properly in judgments. In a similar way, a 
given set of judgments J is capable of exemplifying a given proposition 
p only to a limited extent, and the proposition as such ‘p’ can never be 
grasped in its ‘p’ character in any or every J entailing j1, j2, j3… jn. We may 
thus say that ‘p’ is by no means a judgment, but rather what judgments 
refer to by exemplifying it. In the last analysis, the set (Inbegriff) ‘P’ of 
all propositions as such (‘p1’, ‘p2’, ‘p3’… ‘pn’) is not even a proposition as 
such, but rather, as Bolzano points out, is identical in a certain way with 
an aspect of God’s knowledge.
As Bolzano writes,
The all-knowing God knows not only every true but also every false proposi-
tion (Satz). He knows not only those propositions that are taken to be true 
or conceived of by any created being, but also those which are not taken to 
be true and are not even conceived of by any creature either now or in the 
future.15
Bolzano’s analysis points out that judgments (or Swinburne’s proposi-
tions) are such that they refer to their own non-propositional dimension. 
Even if we do not take into account the notion of first and second order 
mysteries, it seems to be possible to argue that no propositional truth is 
a self-contained unit of meaning, but refers to greater contexts, in the 
last analysis to God’s mind, which cannot be expressed propositionally 
in its full extent. If a message M is a unit of communication such that 
propositions p1, p2, p3… pn are moments of M, then M is a unit implying 
P, that is the set of p1, p2, p3… pn. Given that M is a greater unit of 
communication than P, M implies P but is not identical with P, that is 
to say M > P, in which ‘>’ expresses implication but not identity. We can 
thus say that P expresses or exemplifies M, only if P is implied in M in 
such a way that it exemplifies M in the form of p1, p2, p3… pn. On the 
15 Bernard Bolzano, Grundlegung der Logik (Wissenschaftslehre I/II), edited by Friedrich 
Kambartel (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1963), 23. When not noted otherwise, I am responsible 
for the translations of the original texts.
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other hand, P exemplifies M, only if M is not implied in P otherwise 
than in the form of p1, p2, p3… pn. If propositions are characteristic of 
P and if M > P, then M is by definition not a proposition, but a message 
that implies propositions. M as such is thus not propositional but can 
be exemplified propositionally in terms of P. This point can be expressed 
with respect to the Christian notion of revelation (CR): if CR is M, CR 
is not propositional, although it can be exemplified propositionally. To 
be more precise, CR is such that it is a set of messages [M] implying M1, 
M2, M3… Mn, each of which can be expressed propositionally, but none 
of which is in itself a proposition.
Because of the relationship between first and second order mysteries 
one can say that divine revelation conceived of in terms of PR cannot be 
understood, save on the basis of divine revelation understood in terms 
of the non-propositional dimension of revelation. The conception of 
RR refers precisely to that dimension. Thus, any proper propositional 
investigation of divine revelation presupposes, inasmuch as possible, 
a proper understanding of RR. If divine revelation is reduced to a 
merely propositional conception, we may not be able to understand 
the nature of PR, given that PR is based on, in the sense of being 
derivative of, RR.
The Bolzano Model of Radical Revelation16
Bolzano’s model of divine revelation (hereafter BM) is in many ways 
close to PR, but, as will be clear, his understanding of divine testimony 
as the crucial element in BM makes it a version of RR. Testimony 
or witnessing is a biblical term that Bolzano investigates first in its 
scriptural background. As he explains, divinely revealed religions, such 
16 Bolzano is well known for his work on the mathematics of infinity. Anton Günther, 
in the view of some of his commentators the most ingenious Austrian philosopher of 
the 19th century, was opposed not only to Bolzano, his Prague teacher in philosophy, but 
also to the emerging Neo-Scholasticism; instead Günther chose a way of thinking that 
was sharply polemical both with German idealism and the traditional philosophizing 
in the Church. His publications led to an investigation against him in Rome. After the 
condemnation of some of his teachings by the Church in 1857 Günther withdrew from 
public life.
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as the religion of Israel and Christianity, always considered themselves 
as warranted by God’s testimony (Hebrew edah [Strong 05713], Greek 
marturia [Strong 3144]).
Bolzano offers a general and a particular understanding of God’s 
testimony. In the general sense, testimony is defined as follows:
I say […] that A testifies to B a certain belief b, if A undertakes an action 
with the definite intention that B, when proceeding in accordance with his 
best insights, be able to see it as A’s will that he accept belief b on the basis 
that A takes b to be true.17
General testimony has several kinds that share the common feature of 
being expressed in certain characteristic events in the created world. 
Thus, there are oral and written forms of testimony and even the lack of 
testimony in the explicit sense of the word may count as God’s testimony 
in a given situation. God’s testimony in the proper sense, however, is God’s 
utmost action in which He testifies His own action in and by the act itself; 
this Bolzano terms God’s authentic action.
God’s testimony is what Bolzano takes to be God’s revelation (Offen-
barung, hereafter R) in the particular sense of testimony. There is an 
active and a passive sense of God’s testimony. Revelation in the active 
sense is the act of revelation undertaken by a subject in order to express 
a message to another subject. Revelation in the passive sense is the 
result of the act of revelation. In Bolzano’s definitions, both senses are 
important, since revelation as an action always results in revelation as 
an object.
Bolzano’s definition of revelation has several steps through which he 
offers an ever more specific meaning of the term. In its first and general 
sense, Bolzano defines revelation as follows:
R1: A reveals or announces belief b to B if A is a full or a partial cause of 
the emergence of b in B.18
In R1 there is no information as to the exact character of A’s revealing b 
to B. The expression “full or partial cause” refers to the fact that ‘revealing’ 
17 Bernard Bolzano, Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft, Vols. 1–4 (Stuttgart-Bad 
Canstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag-Günther Holzbog, 1994), I, 108.
18 Ibid., I, 107.
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may or may not use mediating moments, such as words or other signs. On 
the other hand, we do not know whether ‘revealing’ or ‘announcing’ is an 
articulately intentional action of A, or if it belongs rather to the nature 
of A that, inasmuch as it is A, it reveals b to B.
In R2 however we can say with Bolzano that
R2: A reveals or announces b to B if A is a full or a partial cause of the 
emergence of b in B, and A’s action is accompanied by knowledge and will 
as to its own activity.19
R1 is termed by Bolzano inauthentic revelation; R2, consequently, is authen-
tic revelation. The authenticity of R2 is given in the intentional character 
of A’s revealing b to B. A has the intention to reveal b to B in ways that 
can be mediate or immediate, that is A can be both a full or a partial cause 
of b in B. Bolzano, moreover, emphasizes that the intentional character 
of A’s action is given by both A’s knowledge and will, in accordance with 
Bolzano’s understanding of God as possessing these faculties.
So far Bolzano has defined ‘revelation’ in a general sense; now he turns 
his attention to divine revelation. R3 is for Bolzano divine revelation in the 
inauthentic sense. Divine revelation in the inauthentic sense is such that 
God reveals or announces b to B in such a way that b is unconditionally 
willed and known by God. That is to say b is revelation in a general religious 
sense of the word, inasmuch as b is such as to contribute to the salvation 
of a certain number of persons. In Bolzano’s definition:
R3: A reveals or announces b to B if A is a full or partial cause of the emer-
gence of b in B, and A’s action is accompanied by unconditional knowledge 
and will as to its own activity.20
In the sense of R3 all religions are revelations, inasmuch as, Bolzano 
explains, there is no human or non-human belief that is not some effect 
of God’s will and knowledge. Since ‘religion’ in Bolzano’s understanding is 
the totality of beliefs (Meinungen) possessed by a human being at any time 
of his life with reference to his virtue and happiness, so various religions 
of human history can indeed count as ‘revelations’ in accordance with R3.
19 Ibid., I, 107.
20 Ibid., I, 112.
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It is however only definition R4 that offers Bolzano’s most charac-
teristic understanding of divine revelation. We have divine revelation in 
the strict sense of the word if and only if
R4: A reveals b to B if A is the full cause of b in B, and A’s action is not only 
accompanied by unconditional knowledge and will as to its own activity, 
but A testifies that b is fully acknowledged and willed by A in order that B 
accepts b as R.21
In contradistinction to the previous definitions, revelation in the sense of 
R4 is not restricted to being merely an ‘announcement’; it can take various 
forms which we have briefly considered above in connection with the 
kinds of God’s testimonies. The key concept in R4 is indeed ‘testimony’ 
which, on BM, is an ultimate concept not to be analyzed in other terms. 
As Bolzano emphasizes, God’s testimony coincides with God’s action as 
to some sort of change in the world. He seems to think that, in certain 
cases, the absence of an anticipated change (such as the interruption of 
the Sun’s visible movement across the sky) can be seen as a change in the 
world produced by God’s intervention. Bolzano stresses too that God’s 
action is intentional with respect not only to b but also to B’s acceptance 
of b as R. If b entails that A takes b to be true unconditionally and fully, 
then it follows deontically that B too takes b to be true unconditionally. 
Nevertheless, Bolzano does not raise the problem of the conditions of 
the subject’s understanding of a certain occurrence, physical or mental, 
as God’s revelation.
R4 entails God’s authentic action understood as authentically divine 
revelation accompanied by God’s unconditional knowledge and will in 
order that B accept b as revealed by God. God’s testimony, in Bolzano’s 
view, cannot be unconditionally identified either with the existence of 
Scriptures, or with a series of historic events, such as Christ’s life, or 
even with the magisterium or the sacramental life of the Church. R is 
expressed in all of these factors, but it remains, essentially, God’s utmost 
and authentic action — His testimony that makes any of the factors 
mentioned a moment in R.
21 Ibid., I, 113–115.
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It is important to note that Bolzano applies the then widely accepted 
distinction between formal and material revelation.22 R is formal if its 
content, once revealed, can be understood by the human mind in such a 
way that the content of formal revelation is by itself evident and certain. 
R is, however, material only if its content, even if revealed, cannot be 
fully understood by the human mind. The human being can only accept 
material revelation ‘in faith’.
If I term BM a sort of RR, I refer not only to his understanding of 
divine testimony, but also to the emphasis on the very fact that there is 
material revelation. I do not want to deny however that many points in 
Bolzano’s views stand closer to PR than to RR.
The Günther Model of Radical Revelation
The Günther model of RR (hereafter GM) as put forward in Günther’s 
collected works, can be approached in three ways.23 In terms of ecclesiol-
ogy, Günther holds that RR is factually present in the Church, since the 
Church is in a way Christ Himself; and while Christ has become invisible 
after His ascension, there is a visible representative of His person, the 
visible side of the invisible Christ, namely, the bishop of Rome.
In terms of Christology, RR is fully given in the person of Christ. 
Christ is the unique, unrepeatable moment not only in the history of 
humanity, but a fortiori in God’s reality itself. Christ is the miracle as 
such, as Günther holds, who consummated in His person the fullness of 
R. The structure of GM can be reduced to the simple statement that Jesus 
Christ embodies and expresses “the fullness of God.” (Col 2:9) Günther 
emphasizes the factual character of the person of Christ; so much so that 
for him the existence of Christ is the ultimate fact of all possible and 
22 Ibid., I, 128.
23 Anton Günther, Gesammelte Schriften, Neue Ausgabe in neun Baenden (Wien, 1882. 
Unveränderte Nachdruck, Frankfurt: Minerva G. M. B. H., 1968). Since Günther’s thoughts 
are not systematically proposed in any of his works, I have also made use of the works 
of some commentators, most importantly Josef Mader, Offenbarung als Selbstoffenbarung 
Gottes. Hegels Religionsphilosophie als Anstoss für ein neues Offenbarungsverständnis in der 
katholischen Theologie des 19. Jahrhunderts (München-Hamburg-London: LIT, 2000) and 
Joseph Pritz, Glauben und Wissen bei Anton Günther. Eine Einführung in sein Leben 
und Werk mit einer Auswahl aus seinen Schriften (Wien: Herder 1963).
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actual facts. Just as the human being is God’s testimony (Gottes Zeugnis) 
in a certain way, so too Christ is Zeugnis, but infinitely more so than the 
human being in the created order (Günther, Janusköpfe, 115).
There is a third approach to GM in Günther’s writings: the strictly 
speaking philosophical understanding of divine revelation (Günther, 
Peregrins Gastmahl, 157 sq.). It is due to Günther’s Cartesianism that his 
starting point is human consciousness, more precisely the kind of certitude 
given in one’s own self-consciousness. Following the Cartesian line of 
argument, Günther points out that certitude is in the last analysis self-
referring and any heteronomous form of certainty is logically dependent 
on the former and basic kind. Still, as Günther points out, human certainty 
can never be absolute. In any act of knowledge, I recognize not only the 
certainty of my own conscious existence, but also its limited character. I 
as a conscious being am finite — an insight immediately given together 
with the insight into the certainty of my own conscious existence. I cannot 
however recognize the limited nature of my own conscious existence 
except on the basis of an even deeper insight — given as the third moment 
in the insight of self-certitude — of the existence of infinity as opposed 
to my own finitude. Since self-certitude is limited, I recognize that there 
is an infinite self-certitude in contradistinction to which I recognize my 
own limited certitude. In other words, Günther holds that it is possible 
for us to arrive at the recognition of God’s infinity on the basis of the 
recognition of our own finitude.24
As Günther writes: „Just as my own knowledge of myself (as an 
existence for itself ) is certain, so my knowledge of God is certain.” 
(Günther, Janusköpfe, 275). Although Günther seems to suggest that the 
certainty is of the same kind in the two cases (in the case of my own 
consciousness, and in the knowledge of God), he in fact means only an 
analogy between the finite and the infinite. The finite character of the 
human person can be comprehended as given in the inherent process 
of human consciousness; and that is the process that leads, in the final 
instance, to the recognition of God’s infinity as surpassing my own 
human and finite existence.25
24 This is clearly Descartes’ standpoint too. Cf. Mader, Offenbarung als Selbstoffenbarung 
Gottes, 285.
25 Mader, Offenbarung als Selbstoffenbarung Gottes, 280.
115two models of radical revelation
The finite nature of human consciousness is expressed also in that it 
becomes realized in three steps or phases. First, the human ego conceives 
itself as an object. Second, in grasping itself as an object it realizes its 
subjectivity. And it is in the third step, in the synthesis of its being an 
object and a subject at the same time, that human consciousness is able to 
conceive itself as a person. The human person is endowed with the faculties 
of passivity (mind, Vernunft) and activity (will, Wille) which are united in 
the substance of the person. In contradistinction to 20th century personalist 
philosophies, Günther’s understanding of the person culminates in the 
third moment of the process of self-realization, in the synthesis of mind 
and will. The human person is free, although his freedom is limited like 
his self-certitude (Günther, Süd– und Nordlichter, 140 sq.).
In considering the logical structure of the three approaches it becomes 
clear that, for Günther, divine revelation as embodied in the person of 
Christ is the most important moment. This ultimate fact is the logical 
starting point for discovering the life of divine reality as it is in itself 
as well as the life of the human person who, in accordance with the 
Christian understanding, is made in the likeness of God. We are able to 
understand human personhood as an image of God, because God made 
human beings in His likeness. We nevertheless know of God in virtue 
of the fact of divine revelation, and more particularly in virtue of the 
fullness of revelation embodied in the person of Christ. At this point it 
becomes clear again that in Günther’s view the philosophy and theology 
of revelation are fused in a way characteristic of German Idealism.
Thus it becomes possible for Günther to develop his complex model 
of divine revelation as self-revelation. He distinguishes between internal 
and external revelation (revelatio ad intra, revelatio ad extra), the former 
meaning the immanent life of divine reality (Günther, Vorschule I, 112 
sq.). The fundamental point is that God in himself is nothing other than 
self-disclosure, revelatio; divine being is identical with being disclosed or 
revealed, first immanently in God Himself. Just as the existence of human 
persons consists in the process of self-realization, via the three phases 
mentioned above, so too God is self-realization in the ultimate sense of 
the word, in a sense we are not capable of understanding fully. The way 
we understand divine self-realization is linear or sequential; still it is a 
way of conceiving of God’s reality. Accordingly, God realizes Himself in 
the three persons of the Trinity, each of Whom represents a step towards 
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His own absolute fullness. The Father is understood thereby as God’s 
self-objectification; the Son as the subjective moment in divine reality; 
and the Holy Spirit as the synthesis of the two previous moments in 
God’s essence. God as trinity and God as unity coincide fully in God’s 
divine reality; but it can humanly be reconstructed as an infinite process 
or activity in which the three moments can be distinguished.
God’s reality understood as ‘revelation’ implies no necessary mecha-
nism, but rather absolute freedom; and this understanding is consonant 
with the traditional Christian thesis that goodness is self-diffusing (bonum 
est diffusivum sui).26 God is “by His nature” (that is to say in accordance 
with His absolute freedom) self-revealing. The very basis of self-revelation 
is God’s reality seen as a process of immanent self-revelation. Such a view 
seems theologically in no way reproachable as Günther emphasizes that 
the relationship between the three persons and the one divine substance 
forms an ultimate unity understood in accordance with the traditional 
Christian conception.
As Günther writes,
I recognize and confess one God in three persons. He is One in His essence or 
being. He is Three as to the form of His existence. I recognize Him in His one 
essence, because thinking needs only one being that exists by itself in order 
to grasp, on the basis of that one being, all other beings which do not exist 
by themselves. The One, however, is in three Persons, because He as being by 
itself must at the same time be His own Knowledge by itself. This Knowledge 
is absolute self-consciousness or absolute self-intuition (Selbstschauung) in 
such a way that He, while totally emanating Himself, sets His own being 
against Himself in the total identity (or essential selfsameness) of the one who 
emanates and the one who is emanated. (Günther, Peregrins Gastmahl, 355).
Günther’s understanding of external revelation (revelatio ad extra) follows 
the Christian understanding in an original way. As opposed to Hegel, who 
maintained no difference between the internal and the external (histori-
cal) life of the Spirit, Günther suggests that it is crucial for Christian 
philosophy to emphasize the categorical difference between internal and 
external revelation. God is entirely free in initiating and accomplishing 
26 Cf. “Bonum enim, secundam suam rationem, est diffusivum sui.” Thomas Aquinas, 
ST, I-II q, 1 a, 4. And see also Bonaventure: “Secundum igitur bonum summe diffusium 
est sui,” Itinerarium, Ch. VI. 
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His external revelation, that is to say His primary and secondary revelation. 
These aspects of revelation are transcendent; they constitute, first, the 
creation of non-divine reality (primary revelation ad extra), and second, 
the work of redemption realized by Christ (secondary revelation ad 
extra). Creation is God’s primary external revelation — the center and 
accomplishment of which is the first human being, “the first Adam.” 
There is again a threefold structure in the primary external revelation 
that I shall not consider here in detail; suffice it to mention that human 
beings, as authentic representatives of this kind of divine revelation, are 
finite manifestations or exemplifications of the structure of God’s internal 
revelation.
As opposed to the “first Adam,” Jesus Christ the “second Adam” is not 
only the fullness of divine revelation ad extra, but at the same time the 
fullness of divine revelation. Divine revelation as expressed in Christ can 
be approached from two angles. On the one hand, the person of Christ 
represents God’s redemptive act, which is to abolish original sin and 
to restore the initial innocence of human beings. This aspect of divine 
revelation concerns the dimension of the past. On the other hand, Christ 
is the manifestation not only of God’s external revelation, but also of the 
internal one such that He discloses a new moment in divine reality. By 
assuming human nature, the second person of the Trinity in a way deifies 
humanity, that is He makes some human persons partake in divine reality 
in a way that was not possible before the incarnation of Christ. This aspect 
of divine revelation concerns the dimension of the future.
From the human perspective, it seems that the importance of the 
secondary divine revelation ad extra consists in the fact that it expresses 
the dynamism of God’s internal life in a particular way. It expresses divine 
reality as a process of renovation, as it were, in which new moments of 
God’s reality become manifest. The importance of this aspect of secondary 
divine revelation ad extra can be seen as soon as we consider the future 
aspect of revelation. Divine revelation, in accordance with the Christian 
understanding, has not only the aspect of past and present, but that 
of future too in which the totality of God’s reality becomes visible for 
some human and non-human persons in what is traditionally called 
the beatific vision. God’s self-revelation reaches its full radicalism in 
that moment, whereas divine revelation is given in its fullness already 
in the person of Christ. An important point to emphasize: the dynamic 
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structure of GM makes the aspect of the future an inherent moment 
of divine revelation in a way that is not characteristic of BM (Günther, 
Vorschule I, 96 sq.).27
Günther distinguishes two conceptions of RR. According to the 
first, God is self-revealing in Himself and for Himself in His own 
immanent reality; according to the second, He is self-revealing to the 
created world in virtue of the incarnation of the second person of the 
Trinity. Günther attributes the fullness of RR to the second sense of 
self-revelation; God’s self-revelation in the proper sense of the word 
becomes realized in virtue of the secondary revelation ad extra. The 
radical character of GM can be sufficiently seen in all these moments; it 
is not only God’s self-revelation that is at the center of GM, but rather 
the radical self-revelation of God.
Still, God’s radical revelation remains a perennial mystery for the 
human mind. Since the human mind is finite, divine revelation, even if it 
is received as fully as possible, even if it discloses God’s innermost reality, 
remains a secret.28 Divine revelation, we may say, is primarily a mysterium 
stricte dictum, it is — to use the distinction mentioned in the description of 
BM — material revelation in its essence. There is no conceivable proposi-
tion, which can fully express, exemplify, or make propositionally clear 
what God’s revelation is in its material essence.
As opposed to BM, therefore, GM is based on the peculiar, redemp-
tive or salvific fact of DR. Philosophical theology is based on the same 
moment, with the consequence however that there is even less room for 
the distinction between natural and supernaturally enlightened reason in 
GM. In this sense, Günther’s philosophical theology is more radical than 
BM. Still, both models share the principle of divine warrant in the context 
of Church, tradition, and magisterium. Günther’s emphasis on DR fits 
in well with his understanding of philosophical theology as a reflection 
of objective data; above all the datum of the Incarnation.
In both models, the concept of RR hangs together with the radical 
character of the respective philosophical theologies. The radicalism of 
philosophical theology is expressed in Günther’s thought in his ac-
centuated anti-Scholasticism. For Günther, it was the all too strong 
27 Günther is convinced that his “speculative theology” is the way in which Christianity 
as the true philosophy would demonstrate divine truth in its fullness in the future.
28 Mader, Offenbarung als Selbstoffenbarung Gottes, 268.
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rationalistic tendencies of Scholasticism, which led to the emergence of 
monistic philosophies in the 19th century. Christian philosophy should 
overcome, in Günther’s view, the monistic tendencies both in scholasti-
cism and in monistic philosophical systems. The only way to reach that 
objective is the standpoint of a strong metaphysical dualism between 
the divine and the human. As Günther writes: “My theism is the result 
of a life-long process in which I have become fully conscious of my 
own disgust concerning all forms of deification of created beings, all 
forms of making God and the creature essentially equal.” (Günther, 
Janusköpfe, 411).
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